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This paper analyses the dynamic investment and growth prospects of a financially 
constrained firm.  Three types of financing constraints are examined: internal finance, 
debt ceiling and exponential interest costs.  To study the growth dynamics of firms 
subject to the above constraints, numerical solutions, for assigned parameter values, are 
provided using the reverse shooting Runge-Kutta algorithm.  The simulation results 
suggest that the firm’s real and financial variables are highly correlated for constrained 
firms, as the optimal policy of these businesses is to over-invest in capital in the initial 
years, and then deplete this excess capacity in future periods.  This, however, results in 
slower rates of growth for the constrained firm, and for entities facing a debt ceiling, 
greater rates of fluctuation in their rates of expansion. 
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FINANCING CONSTRAINTS AND CORPORATE GROWTH 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In many developing countries, the two main sources of finance are retained earnings and 
credit, primarily from commercial banks.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) find 
that even as the stock markets in these countries develop, internal finance and credit 
remain the dominant source of investment finance.  Moreover, a sudden lack of credit or 
internal finance can be very costly in terms of investment opportunities foregone, and 
future growth prospects.  Financing constraints can also result in increased economic 
volatility, since it inhibits the ability of firms to plan with any level of certainty. 
Most of the theoretical and empirical studies on financing constraints have limited 
the scope of study to just investment.  Financing constraints, however, can influence a 
wide variety of firm variables such as growth and profitability (Moore, Craigwell and 
Maxwell, 2003).  Empirical studies in the area also suffer from measurement related 
problems (Hubbard, 1998):  for instance, the shadow cost of capital can only be proxied 
by Tobin’s q under very restrictive assumptions – perfect capital markets – which are 
unlikely to be applicable to most developing states. 
In this study, the authors examine three types of financing constraints: internal 
finance, debt ceilings and exponential interests costs.  These models are formulated 
within a continuous time optimal control framework.  In addition to the mathematical 
derivations of the investment policy functions, the models are also calibrated and 
simulated using the reverse shooting fourth-order Runge-Kutta method (see Judd, 1998).  
By using computational techniques, the authors avoid the measurement bias inherent in 
most econometric approaches.  The approach also allows the examination of the long-run 
dynamics of constrained businesses relative to that for an unconstrained enterprise. 
The simulation results suggest that constrained firms would find it more difficult 
to maximise the lifetime value of the firm because the optimal strategy requires the firm 
to over-invest.  This dynamic path, however, is characterised by slower rates of growth 
and lower levels of sales/output, and in the case of the debt ceiling, greater volatility.  4
The paper is organised as follows.  Section II introduces the models used while 
Section III gives the simulated growth paths of firms subject to various types of financing 
constraints.  Section IV concludes. 
 
 
II.  THE MODEL 
 
Consider a small open economy with constant population and an exogenously determined 
interest rate (r ).  The representative firm is assumed to produce final output, Y , using 
the variable inputs real capital, K  and labour, L , with constant returns to technology, 
represented by  ) , ( L K F Y = , that is  ∞ = > < ) 0 , ( , 0 , 0 , K f f f f L KL LL KK .   
 
 
A.  The Firm’s Value Maximisation Problem 
 
Capital is assumed to depreciate by the rate δ , while investment expenditure of  t I , only 
yields  t t t I K I < ) , ( φ  of new capital due to installation costs.  The evolution of the capital 
stock can therefore be represented as:   
t t t t K K I K δ φ − = ) , ( &                        ( 1 )  
where ) , ( t t K I φ  has the following properties,  K K KI II KK ∀ = < 0 ) , 0 ( , 0 , , φ φ φ φ .  The use 
of scale dependent costs of adjustment of capital agrees with Goolsbee and Gross (1997) 
empirical finding of significant non-convexities in adjustment costs. 
  The firm chooses investment and labour to maximise its discounted stream of 
future profits (Π): 
  [] dt I wL L K F e t t t t
t − − ∫
∞ − ) , ( max
0
ρ                      ( 2 )  
where 0 > ρ  is the rate of time preference and w is the wage rate.   
  5
The first order conditions





















 and shows that investment is positively related to the shadow cost of capital. 
 
 
B.  A Firm Constrained by Internal Finance 
 
Assume that the firm’s investment is limited, since it cannot issue debt on the local 
financial market and therefore has to depend on internal finance/retained earnings.  This 
constraint is represented mathematically as: 
  t t I Π <                         ( 4 )  
There could be many reasons why the firm may not be able to borrow on the domestic 
financial market, such as capital market imperfections and the limited development of the 
financial market.  The internal finance constraint is therefore a reduced form 
representation of imperfections that are not explicitly modelled in this study. 
There are two types of firms in the economy; those that are constrained by 
internal finance (denoted by superscript c) and those that are unconstrained (represented 
by superscript u ).  The manager of the constrained firm maximises Equation (2) subject 
to Equations (1) and (4), while the director of the unconstrained firm simply maximises 
Equation (2) subject to Equation (1).  The firm’s state variable is its stock of equity, 
where the corresponding co-state variable is denoted by  t q , which can be interpreted as 
the shadow cost of new capital.  For the financially constrained firm, the problem also 
                                                 
2 The first order conditions (FOC) are given by  
[] 0 ) , ( = −w L K F t t L                               
  t t t I q K I ) , ( 1 φ η = +                        
  ) 1 )( , ( )] , ( [ η φ δ ρ + − − + = t t K t t K t t L K f K I q q &                       
  0 ] [ * 0 ] ) , ( [ * , 0 *, = − Π = − ≥ t t t t t I and K K I q q η δ φ η               







ρ                                  6
includes η , the shadow cost of the liquidity constraint.  The conditions necessary for the 
maximisation of the current value Hamiltonian are: 
[] 0 ) , ( = − w L K F t t L                              (5) 
  t t t I q K I ) , ( 1 φ η = +                               (6) 
 ) 1 )( , ( )] , ( [ η φ δ ρ + − − + = t t K t t K t t L K f K I q q &                       (7) 
 0 ] [ * 0 ] ) , ( [ * , 0 *, = − Π = − ≥ t t t t t I and K K I q q η δ φ η              (8) 
  0 lim =
−
∞ → t t
t
t K q e
ρ                                (9) 
while noting that for the unconstrained firm  0 = η . 
  Normalising labour to unity, the optimal capital spending functions can be 
obtained from Equation (6).  For the unconstrained firm, the optimal level of investment 
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.  Equations (10) and (11) imply that investment is positively related to 
the shadow cost of capital, while Equation (11) shows that investment for the constrained 
firm is negatively correlated with the shadow cost of the liquidity constraint. 
  
 
C.  A Firm Constrained by a Debt Ceiling 
 
In the model presented in Section II-B firms were not allowed to issue debt/obtain loans 
from financial institutions.  However, most businesses usually utilise some proportion of 
external borrowing, albeit significantly smaller than retained earnings, to finance 
investment (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996).  To incorporate borrowing into the model, an  7
additional state variable is employed: debt, denoted by  t B .  The interest rate on debt, r , 
is assumed to be fixed overtime.  The evolution of debt can therefore be given by: 
  t t t t t t wL I L K F rB B − + − = ) , ( &                  ( 1 2 )  
Since debt is used to finance investment, the change in debt is positively associated to 
investment, while the greater the profitability of the firm, the smaller the amount of new 
debt it needs to contract or the greater its ability to repay outstanding debts.  The firm, 
however, encounters a debt ceiling of the form: 
  B Bt ≤                    ( 1 3 )  
which may be imposed by the companies articles of incorporation or market driven. 
  The firm again chooses investment and labour to maximise its discounted stream 
of future profits: 
  ] ) , ( [ max
0 t t t t t
t rB I wL L K F e − − − ∫
∞ −ρ                 ( 1 4 )  
The value function presented above differs from that given in Equation (2) as a result of 
borrowing costs.   
The inter-temporal maximisation problem presented involves a state-space 
constraint.  Thus, the state variable is no longer continuous and can experience jumps 
around so-called junction points, or where the state-space constraint becomes binding.  
To solve the problem, the study follows the approach proposed by Hestenes (1966), 
which introduces another constraint that explicitly takes into account the junction points.  
The conditions necessary for the maximisation of the current value Hamiltonian formed 
from Equations (13), (12), (11) and (1) are as follows: 
  [] [ ] 0 1 ) , ( = − − − t t t t L w L K F θ λ                  ( 1 5 )  
 1 ) , ( ) ( = − + t t I t t t K I q φ θ λ                   ( 1 6 )  
 0 , 0 = ≥ t t t B B θ  
  [] B B when t t < = ≤ 0 0 θ&  
  [] [ ] t t t t k t t k t L K F K I q q θ λ δ φ ρ + − − + − = 1 ) , ( ) , ( &                ( 1 7 )  
  [] t t t r θ λ ρλ λ + − + = 1 &                   ( 1 8 )  
 0 =
−
∞ → t t
t
t K q e Lim
ρ                    ( 1 9 )   8
 0 =
−
∞ → t t
t
t B e Lim λ
ρ                    ( 2 0 )  
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noting that  0 = θ &  for the unconstrained firm.  However, for the constrained firm, the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions require that when  0 ≠ θ  then  0 = B & .  From Equation (12), one 
therefore obtains: 
  B r wL L K F I t t t
c
t − − = ) , (                   ( 2 2 )  
The constrained firm simply invests output net of labour and borrowing costs.  In 
contrast, the investment function for the unconstrained firm is positively related to the 
shadow cost of capital and debt, and the capital stock.   
 
 
D.  A Firm Constrained by High Interest Rates 
 
In the model outlined in Section II-C, the firm faced a fixed interest rate at all levels of 
debt.  In practice, however, firms usually pay differing rates of interest depending on the 
level of debt that they currently hold.  To incorporate this phenomenon into the model 
presented in Section II-C, it is assumed that the firm has exponential debt costs: 
  ) exp( t t aB r r =                    ( 2 3 )  
Equation (23) implies that as the firm’s level of debt rises, so to does the rate of interest it 
has to pay.   
The firm’s maximisation problem is the same as that presented in the previous 
section, abstracting from the debt ceiling.  The conditions necessary for the maximisation 
of the current value Hamiltonian formed from Equations (13), (22), (11) and (1) are as 
follows: 
  [] 0 ) , ( = − w L K F t t L                               ( 2 4 )  
  t t t I t K I q λ φ − =1 ) , (                                (25) 
 ) 1 )( , ( )] , ( [ t t t K t t K t t L K F K I q q λ φ δ ρ − − − + = &                   (26)  9
  ) 1 )]( exp( [ ) exp( [ t t t t t t aB r aB aB r λ ρλ λ − + + = &                ( 2 7 )  








t B e K q e λ
ρ ρ                  ( 2 8 )  
  ] ) , ( ) , ( [ 0 ] ) , ( [ , 0 ,
* * * *
t t t t t t t t t t wL K I L K F B r and K K I q q − + − = − ≥ φ λ δ φ λ   (29) 
The investment function for firms that face a constant interest rate and a exponential debt 
cost is given in Equation (21).  Thus, although the rate of interest and therefore the level 




III.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES  
 
To study the growth dynamics of the firms given above, numerical solutions for assigned 
parameter values are provided using the reverse shooting Runge-Kutta algorithm (see 
Appendix).  In the numerical solutions that follow, the following benchmark parameter 
values are used:  39 . 0 = α ,  07 . 0 = δ ,  1 = L , 04 . 0 = ρ ,  1 = w ,  60 . 0 = c , 50 . 0 =
c η  and 
00 . 0 =
u η  and  2 = T k .  The capital share (α ) is set to a figure consistent with the 
findings in growth accounting and comparable calibration studies (Strulik, 1999).  Given 
that the authors are mainly interested in corporate development or growth (as opposed to 
absolute values) the variables  L and w are set to unity.  The rate of depreciation is the 
average rate of depreciation used by firms in Barbados (see Moore, Craigwell and 
Maxwell, 2003) and is in line with other studies in the area (Xie and Yuen, 2002).  The 
riskless rate is equal to the time preference rate and is the same as that used by Strulik 
(1999), one percentage point higher than Xie and Yuen (2002) and two percentage points 
more than Pratap (2000).  The remaining values are chosen arbitrarily, since no similar 
studies were found which looked at these variables.  To ensure that the results were not 
significantly affected by the choice of these parameters, various values were tried in the 
simulation phase of the study, but the results were similar and are not reported.  
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A.  A Firm Constrained by Internal Finance 
 
Figure 1 plots the capital stock, growth, shadow cost of capital and investment-capital 
ratios for both types of corporations (constrained and unconstrained).  The solid lines 
show the optimal paths for the constrained firm, while the broken lines represent those of 
the unconstrained enterprise. 
  The capital stock path of the constrained firm is greater than that of the 
unconstrained enterprise for most of the simulated period, but converges over time.  This 
situation occurs since the optimal strategy for a constrained firm requires that it initially 
over invests in order to ensure that it has enough capital to maximise its value overtime, 
and then use its spare capacity overtime by reducing its investment intensity.  As the 
shadow cost of the liquidity constraint rises (η), the greater the level of investment in the 
initial years and the larger the distance between the capital stock for the two types of 
corporations.  Therefore, the optimal capital path of the constrained firm is more difficult 
to attain. 
  As a result of the constraint on investment, the investment intensity of the 
enterprise, measured by the investment-capital ratio, is higher for the unconstrained firm 
than that for the constrained entity.  This occurs since the shadow cost of an additional 
unit of capital is greater for constrained entities.  The constrained firm finds it optimal to 
have a lower investment ratio, since it can utilise some proportion of the capital it has 
from the previous period.      
  Figure 1 also shows that the optimal growth path for constrained businesses is 
lower than that for their unconstrained peers.  The difference in growth rates is 
particularly large during the initially years of operation.  This finding implies that 
financing constraints can have a significant impact on a firm’s probability of survival, 
since in the early years of development the firm’s growth rate tends to be lower if it is 
constrained by internal finance.  This finding shows how important it is to have a vibrant 
market for venture capital finance, and could possibly explain why in some developing 
countries many young corporations tend to fail (Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi, 
2003).  11
  The implied correlation between growth, g, and the investment-capital ratio and 
cash and the investment-capital ratio are shown in Figure 2.  The figure shows that for the 
constrained firm there is a strong positive linear association between investment and 
growth, while this is not the case for the unconstrained entity.  The main reason for this 
outcome, as is shown in the two bottom panels, is that the growth prospects of a 
constrained firm is highly related to the availability of retained earnings, while this is not 
the case for the unconstrained firm.  The high correlation between cash and growth, 
however, implies that the volatility of the constrained firm is much greater, since its 
investment prospects, and by extension its growth path, is tied to the level of cash it has 
available.   
 
 
B.  A Firm Constrained by A Debt Ceiling 
 
Figure 3 plots the capital stock, growth, shadow cost of capital, investment-capital ratios 
and debt for the constrained and unconstrained firms.  The simulation is undertaken 
assuming that the firm faces the debt ceiling from its first period of operation.  As a 
result, the firm therefore plans its activities and where it wants to be at period t with full 
knowledge that the debt ceiling will be in effect.  The debt ceiling is set at 0.2, and the 
firm’s debt balance at period T  is assumed to be zero. 
  Similar to the firm constrained by internal finance, the optimal capital stock for 
the firm when the debt ceiling is binding is higher than for the unconstrained enterprise.  
The optimal capital stock for both the constrained and unconstrained businesses converge 
overtime, since the level of debt needed to finance investment eventually declines.   
Therefore, as the debt ceiling is no longer binding, the dynamics for both types of 
companies converge. 
  Figure 3 also shows the growth path for both entities.  The dynamics of the 
unconstrained firm naturally declines overtime.  In contrast, the growth path for the 
constrained entity exhibits a high degree of variance whilst the debt ceiling is binding, 
and then jumps to the smooth growth path once the constraint is no longer binding.  Note 
also that the rate of growth of the unconstrained firm is everywhere above that for the  12
constrained entity once the constraint is binding.  A similar pattern is evident for the 
investment-capital ratio, which implies that constrained firms are more likely to exhibit a 
greater variance, in terms of growth, than for their unconstrained peers. 
  The debt path of the constrained firm, as expected, lies below that of the 
unconstrained firm.  This implies that borrowing for new investment has to be financed 
partially from retained earnings and borrowings.  One interesting finding, however, is 
that the firm does not fully utilise its available credit limit, in this scenario 0.2.  Firms 
instead prefer to use internal funds rather than the other proportion of the available credit 
line in an attempt to guard against overshooting the optimal level of borrowing, and by 
extension the capital stock, once the constraint is no longer binding.  Pratap (2000) 
reports a similar finding.   
   Figure 4 shows the correlation between investment, growth and cash.  Both types 
of firms exhibit a high correlation between the investment-capital ratio and growth.   
However, there is a much higher correlation for the constrained firm, reflected by the 
slope of the x-y line.  This occurs since growth usually results in greater amounts of cash, 
which for the constrained enterprise implies that investment can expand.  In contrast, the 
unconstrained firm is less restricted by cash and therefore exhibits a loser correlation 
between growth and investment.  The jagged portion of the normally smooth x-y line also 
reflects the sensitivity between cash and investment.   
 
 
C.  A Firm Constrained by Interest Rates 
 
The simulation for the firm facing exponential interest costs is reported in Figure 5 and 6.  
The simulation is undertaken assuming that the unconstrained firm encounters a constant 
borrowing cost of 4%, while r  in Equation (22) is set at 4% as well.  Similar to the 
previous simulations, the optimal capital stock path for the restricted enterprise lies above 
that for the constrained business.  Moreover, the larger the difference between r and  r , 
the greater the distance between the capital stock paths for the two types of firms. 
As a result of over investment in the initial years, the restricted firm therefore 
invests less than its unconstrained peer and obtains a slower rate of growth.  Note,  13
however, that the impact on growth is not as dramatic as in the case of the firm restricted 
by internal finance and a debt ceiling.  The figure also shows that the shadow cost of new 
debt, λ , is much lower than that for the unrestricted firm given that borrowing costs are 
higher.  Therefore, while new borrowing might increase the firm’s value by contributing 
to higher investment, the higher borrowing cost also have to be taken into account.  In 
addition, since the optimal strategy for the firm calls for it to over-invest, it still has to 
contract a higher level of debt, despite the greater borrowing costs. 
Figure 6 plots the correlation between investment, growth and cash.  Similar to 
the case of a firm with a debt ceiling, there exists a greater correlation between growth 
and investment for the constrained firm on accounts of the strong relation between 
investment and cash for the restricted firm. 
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper provides three models of investment under financing constraints.  The models 
examined allow for a firm to be constrained by internal finance, a debt ceiling or 
exponential borrowing costs.  The simulated results show that the firm’s real and 
financial variables are highly correlated for constrained firms.  One key finding of the 
paper is that liquidity constrained firms optimal policy is to over-invest in capital in the 
initial years of operation, and then deplete this excess capacity in future periods.  This, 
however, results in slower rates of growth for the constrained firm.  Another finding of 
the study is that firms facing a debt ceiling, usually experience greater rates of fluctuation 
in their rates of expansion. 
  The findings of this study are particularly important for developing countries with 
relatively undeveloped capital markets, since firms in these countries are usually highly 
dependent on internal finance and debt.  However, the results presented in this study 
show that financing constraints can push the economy onto a lower growth path.  This 
implies that reducing the financing constraints that firms encounter in these countries 
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APPENDIX:  SIMULATING INFINITE-HORIZON DYNAMIC MODELS 
 
The Runge-Kutta method is an approach developed by German mathematicians C.D.T. 
Runge and M.W. Kutta to solve ordinary differential equations (see Judd, 1998, for a 
detailed exposition).  The technique works by using a formula to look where the solution 
is going, and then implement a correction when it is needed.  The mathematical 
formulation for the fourth order Runge-Kutta algorithm is as follows: 














( 2 3 hz Y h x f z i i + + =  
) , ( 3 4 hz Y h x f z i i + + =  
] 2 2 [
6
4 3 2 1 1 z z z z
h
Y Y i i + + + + = +  
where  x is the control variable, Y  the state variable and h the step size. 
  For infinite-horizon problems, where the differential equation has to be integrated 
over long periods, it is preferable to use reverse shooting, since the solution path tends to 
be sensitive to the starting values chosen.  With reverse shooting, one chooses the 
terminal values and then work back to find the initial state.  To reverse time the system of 
equations is multiplied by –1 and simulated using the equations given above.  After the 
solution path is obtained, the solution sequences are inverted to provide the forward-
looking time path for the original system.  16
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FIGURE 2:  
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FIGURE 4:  
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FIGURE 6:  
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